In order to build a secure and an efficient scheme even in the presence of quantum computers, we propose an improved authenticated key agreement scheme based on NTRU for applications in e-health platforms. In fact, user authentication and key agreement are important cryptographic primitives that allow two entities to establish a secure and an authenticated channel over insecure networks. Currently, the security of the most of these primitives relies on RSA or ECC standards, which ensure high security levels. Unfortunately, all cryptosystems based on factorization problems (e.g., RSA) or the discrete logarithm problem in finite groups (e.g., ECC) will be vulnerable to quantum attacks in the next few years due to Shor's algorithm. Security and efficiency analysis show that the proposed scheme can resist various attacks, including quantum attacks while preserving efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, information and communications technologies had changed our everyday life in different areas. New services are provided online, such as e-Commerce, e-Learning and e-Health.
To protect the sensitive data exchanged over public networks, many cryptographic techniques are used. Nowadays, the most dominant cryptosystems are based on the factorization problem (e.g., RSA (Rivest et al., 1978) ) or on the discrete logarithm problem in some finite groups (e.g., Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) (Koblitz, 1987; Miller, 1985) .
In the last few years, Xie et al. (2013) proposed an authentication and key agreement scheme based on RSA for Telecare Medicine Information Systems (TMIS), while Xu et al. (2014) proposed another scheme using ECC. However, despite the current high security of cryptographic protocols based on RSA or ECC, these systems will be vulnerable to the quantum attacks in the future due to Shor's algorithm (Shor, 1997) .
NTRU is a lattice-based public key cryptosystem, which provides encryption and digital signature schemes, it was proposed by Hoffstein et al. (1998) . NTRU has recently standardized through IEEEP1363.1 (Whyte et al., 2008) and X9.98 (ANSI X9.98, 2010) . In fact, the use of NTRU presents an alternative to RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) to prevent quantum attacks. In addition, this choice provides more advantages compared to RSA or ECC, it is efficient and can be implemented in any environment.
In this study, we propose an authenticated key agreement scheme based on NTRU for applications in TMIS. The proposal enables two communicating parties in e-health platforms who share a simple password "pw" to generate a secret and authenticated session key, which will be used to secure subsequent communications through symmetric encryption cryptosystems, for example the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Definition and Notations:
Let N, q and p be three positive integers, the ring R = Z [x]/(x N -1) is called the ring of convolution polynomials. Similarly, we define the ring of convolution polynomials (mod q) as R q = Z q [x]/(x N -1), where Z q = Z/qZ. We denote the convolution multiplication in R by '*'. If f(x) = ∑ and g(x) = ∑ are two polynomials in R, then h(x) = f(x)*g(x) is given by h(x) = ∑ where h k = ∑ . The NTRU encrypt/decrypt scheme: In this section, we describe the NTRU cryptosystem. The NTRU parameters are the positive integers: N, p, q and d, where N and p are primes, q > (6d + 1)p and gcd(N, q) = gcd (p,q) = 1:
• In the keys generation phase, Alice chooses the public parameters (N, p, q, d ) satisfying the security requirement described in Hoffstein et al. (2015) . Alice chooses randomly two polynomials
The polynomial h(x) is Alice's public key. Her private key is f(x).
• In the encryption phase, Bob's plaint text is a polynomial m(x) R whose coefficients satisfy-1/2p < m i ≤ ½ p. Next, Bob chooses a random polynomial r(x) T(d,d) and computes: c(x) ≡ ph(x) * r(x) + m (x) mod q Bob's cipher text is the polynomial c(x).
• In the decryption phase, Alice decrypts the encrypted message c(x) using f(x) by computing a(x) ≡ f(x) * c(x) mod q, the message m(x) is obtained from a(x) by reducing the coefficients of F p (x) * a(x) modulo p, as follows:
We note that the condition q>(6d+ 1) pis necessary for the decryption process.
Description of the proposed scheme:
The server S in e-health platforms allows a user U to register once. After that, U can access to the server S anytime and anywhere using his/her password denoted "pw" without further registrations. After the registration step, U and S share a common password "pw", they also agree on: the NTRU parameters (N, p, q, d) certified by a trusted party, the server's and the user's public keys pk S and pk U , the NTRU encryption (NTRUEnc) and decryption (NTRUDec) functions, a random number generator, a message authentication code MAC and a secure hash function H. The proposed scheme is depicted in Table  1 , it can be performed as follows: 
• The user (resp. The server) randomly chooses r (resp. s) in [1, n], for a chosen n.
• The user (resp. The server) computes X = H (pw) r (resp.Y = H(pw) s ), encrypts it through NTRUEnc using the server's public key pk S (resp. the user's public key pk U ) and sends the encrypted value X * (resp.Y * ) to the server (resp. the user).
• On receiving Y * (resp. X * ), the user (resp. the server) recovers Y (resp. X) by decrypting under its private key sk U (resp.sk S ), they both computeY r = X • The user (resp. the server) computes: u = MAC(k mac , Y * ) (resp. v = MAC(k mac , X * )) and sends u (resp.v) to the server (resp. the user). Each party checks the others MAC and reports a failure in case of a mismatch.
• Now, both parties explicitly confirm knowledge of the session key S k .
We highlight that sk S and sk U are static keys, while S k is an ephemeral key generated at the end of each scheme execution.
Design choices for the proposed scheme: In real world applications, cryptographic protocols should provide an optimal trade-off Security/Efficiency. According to IEEE 1363.1 (Whyte et al., 2008) , X9.98 (ANSI X9.98, 2010) and NIST (Chen et al., 2016) standards, the NTRU based cryptosystems appear to be more practical and use small keys, making it ideal for all environments and more suitable for embedded and mobile systems. Consequently, to ensure the currently required security level k = 128, we choose our scheme parameters as follows: 
Experimental parameters:
To analyze the execution time of cryptographic operations, we compare the total computational cost in the login and the authentication phases of Xie et al. (2013) and Xu et al. (2014) and our proposed scheme. We use PARI/GP systems in the environment (CPU: 2.16 GHz and RAM: 2GB), with the required security parameters for RSA and ECC (Lochter and Merkle, 2010) 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present and discuss our results in the light of the works of Stehlé and Steinfeld (2011) and Hoffstein et al. (2015) and the recent NIST technical report on post-quantum cryptosystems (Chen et al., 2016) .
Security of the proposed scheme:
The security of NTRUEnc relies on the presumed hardness of the "Short Vector Problem" (SVP) in some lattices. Stehlé and Steinfeld (2011) proposed a modified version of NTRUEnc to make it provably secure in the standard model by assuming the quantum intractability of standard worst-case lattice problem in very special lattices.
Recently, Hoffstein et al. (2015) reviewed attacks on NTRUEnc and discussed how can we prevent such attacks by a good choice of security parameters. In this scope and in the aim of avoiding the following attacks, it suffices that:
• Hidden collisions attack (Vaudenay, 1996) : To ensure that no back doors exist in the NTRU parameters, the parameter generation algorithm must be published and certified by a certification authority, using Public Key Infrastructures (PKI).
• Coppersmith-Shamir and lattice reduction attacks: The attack of Coppersmith and Shamir attack (Coppersmith and Shamir, 1997 ) is based on the construction of a lattice L from the parameters N, q, d combined with reduction algorithms (Lenstra et al., 1982) to find the private key. These attacks can be avoided by choosing a prime number N of sufficiently bigger size (e.g., N = 613).
• How grave-Graham attack (Howgrave-Graham, 2007): The polynomials used in the cryptosystem as keys and messages, should be ternary polynomials and the probability p s that a correct guess in the meet-in-the-middle stage must be determined mathematically. In addition, parameters must be chosen so that the expected work to recover both the private key f(x) (from the public key h(x)) and the plaintext m(x) (from the cipher text c(x)), is at least 2 k (for a security level k = 128).
• Decryption failures attack (Howgrave-Graham et al., 2003): The probability of decryption failures must be at most 2 -k for a security level k = 128 (i.e., q > (6d + 1) p). The parameters specified by Hoffstein et al. (2015) meet all the security requirements to secure the NTRUEnc function.
• Additional security requirements: The message authentication code MAC should be unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks. In addition, the hash function H and the random number generator must ensure a random uniformly distributed value in the output.
The proposed scheme satisfies the following additional security properties:
• Resistance against replay attacks: An attacker can intercept X * and Y * , but he cannot compute X or Y. Generally, he cannot deduce k mac . Therefore, he fails to compute a correct message authentication code. Consequently, the proposed scheme can resist the impersonation and the replay attacks.
• Secure mutual authentication: Under the assumption that the message authentication code MAC is unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks, each entity confirms the knowledge of the session key and it is sure that it shares the correct session key with the right partner. Therefore, the proposed scheme ensure a secure mutual authentication.
• Forward quantum-resistance: Data exchanged in public networks today are encrypted using RSA or ECC, the encrypted information can be stolen and stored until quantum computers will be available. Attackers will be able to recover all previous messages. Since NTRU is secure against quantum attacks, the encrypted information using NTRU will remain secure in the future.
Efficiency of the proposed scheme: Using the following notations:
• T H : The time cost of a hash operation;
• T E : The time cost of a modular exponentiation;
• T M : The time cost of the scalar multiplication in ECC; • T S : The time cost of a symmetric encryption or decryption operation.
• T NTRU : The time cost of NTRU encryption or decryption operation.
We get T M ≈ 15ms, T E ≈ 488ms and T NTRU ≈ 5ms. Also, we note that T H and T S are negligible compared to T E or T M . Table 2 summarizes the total time cost of Xie et al. (2013) and Xu et al. (2014) and our proposed scheme.
Results in Table 2 show that NTRU is a fast public key cryptosystem compared to RSA or ECC. The polynomial convolution product is done with simple operations on small coefficients of sizes almost 11bits, while RSA (resp. ECC) requires complex exponentiations (resp. scalar multiplications) with integers of size that can reach 2048 bits (resp. 224 bits) for the same security level (128 bits).
In the NIST report (Chen et al., 2016) , AES is considered as a post-quantum encryption scheme, therefore, we propose the combination of our scheme with AES-128 (or AES-256) to preserve the forward quantum-resistance.
CONCLUSION
Using NTRU cryptosystem, we have proposed a scheme to authenticate users and to generate strong session keys in e-health platforms. The proposal ensures many interesting security features such as confidentiality of session keys, perfect forward secrecy and mutual authentication. Finally, the use of NTRU combined with AES and SHA hash functions provides an efficient and a quantum-resistant alternative to schemes based on RSA or ECC against quantum attacks.
